The IPsec series of protocols makes use of various cryptographic algorithms in order to provide security services. The Internet
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The Internet Key Exchange protocol [RFC7296] is used to negotiate the IPsec parameters, such as encryption algorithms and keys, for protected communications between two endpoints. The IKEv2 protocol itself is also protected by encryption, which is also negotiated between the two endpoints. Negotiation is performed by IKEv2 itself. This document describes the encryption parameters of the IKE protocol, not the encryption parameters of the ESP (IPsec) protocol. Different implementations of IKEv2 may negotiate different encryption algorithms based on their individual local policy. To ensure interoperability, a set of "mandatory-to-implement" IKEv2 encryption algorithms is defined.
Updating Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance
The field of cryptography evolves continiously. New stronger algorithms appear and existing algorithms are found to be less secure then originally thought. Therefore, algorithm implementation requirements and usage guidance need to be updated from time to time to reflect the new reality. The choices for algorithms must be conservative to minimize the risk of algorithm compromised. Algorithms need to be suitable for a wide variety of CPU architectures and device deployments ranging from high end bulk encryption devices to small low-power IoT devices.
The algorithm implementation requirements and usage guidance may need to change over time to adapt to the changing world. For this reason, the selection of mandatory-to-implement algorithms was removed from the main IKEv2 specification and placed in this document.
Updating Algorithm Requirement Levels
Ideally, the mandatory-to-implement algorithm of tomorrow should already be available in most implementations of IKE by the time it is made mandatory. To facilitate this, this document attempts to identify those algorithms for future mandatory-to-implement. There is no guarantee that the algorithms in use today may become mandatory in the future. Published algorithms are continiously subjected to cryptographic attack and may become too weak or could become completely broken before this document is updated.
This document only provides recommendations for the mandatory-toimplement algorithms or algorithms too weak that are recommended not to be implemented. As a result, any algorithm not mentioned in this document MAY be implemented. For clarification and consistency with [RFC4307] an algorithm will be set to MAY only when it has been downgraded. It is expected that deprecation of an algorithm is performed gradually. This provides time for various implementations to update their implemented algorithms while remaining interoperable. Unless there are strong security reasons, an algorithm is expected to be downgraded from MUST to MUST-or SHOULD, instead of MUST NOT. Similarly, an algorithm that has not been mentioned as mandatory-toimplement is expected to be introduced with a SHOULD instead of a MUST.
The current trend toward Internet of Things and its adoption of IKEv2 requires this specific use case to be taken into account as well.
IoT devices are resource constrainted devices and their choice of algorithms are motivated by minimizing the fooprint of the code, the computation effort and the size of the messages to send. This document indicates IoT when a specified algorithm is specifically listed for IoT devices.
Document Audience
The recommendations of this document target IKEv2 implementers. In other words, the recommendations should not be considered for IKEv2 configuration, as a preference for some algorithms. [PAUL: I don't understand this. Clearly MTI are good default choices?]
IKEv1 is out of scope of this document. IKEv1 is deprecated and the recommendations of this document must not be considered for IKEv1.
Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
We define some additional terms here: SHOULD+ This term means the same as SHOULD. However, it is likely that an algorithm marked as SHOULD+ will be promoted at some future time to be a MUST. ENCR_DES can be brute-forced using of-the-shelves hardware. It provides no meaningful security whatsoever and therefor MUST NOT be implemented.
Type 2 -IKEv2 Pseudo-random Function Transforms
Transform Type 2 Algorithms are pseudo-random functions used to generate random values when needed.
In general, if you can trust an algorithm as INTEG algorithm, you can and should also use it as the PRF. When using an AEAD cipher, the choice is PRF is open, and picking one of the SHA2 variants is recommended.
Nir, et al. ------------------+---------+---------+ [IoT] -This requirement is for interoperability with IoT Table 3 PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 was not mentioned in RFC4307, as no SHA2 based authentication was mentioned. PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 MUST be implemented in order to replace SHA1 and PRF_HMAC_SHA1.
PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 SHOULD be implemented as as a future replacement of SHA2_256 or when stronger security is required. PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 is preferred over PRF_HMAC_SHA2_384, as the overhead of PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 is negligible.
PRF_HMAC_SHA1_96 has been downgraded from MUST in RFC4307. There is an industry-wide trend to deprecate its usage.
PRF_AES128_CBC is only recommended in the scope of IoT, as Internet of Things deployments tend to prefer AES based pseudo-random functions in order to avoid implementing SHA2. For the wide VPN deployment, as it has not been widely adopted, it has been downgraded from SHOULD in RFC4307 to MAY.
Type 3 -IKEv2 Integrity Algorithm Transforms
The algorithms in the below table are negotiated in the SA payload and used in the ENCR payload. References to the specifications defining these algorithms are in the IANA registry. When an AEAD algorithm (see Section 3.1) is proposed, this algorithm transform type is not in use. [IoT] -This requirement is for interoperability with IoT Table 4 AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 was not mentioned in RFC4307, as no SHA2 based authentication was mentioned. AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 MUST be implemented in order to replace AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96.
AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256 SHOULD be implemented as as a future replacement of AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 or when stronger security is required. This value has been preferred to AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_384, as the overhead of AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512 is negligible.
AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 has been downgraded from MUST in RFC4307. There is an industry-wide trend to deprecate its usage.
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RSA keys MUST be greater or equal than 20148 bits.
Security Considerations
The security of cryptographic-based systems depends on both the strength of the cryptographic algorithms chosen and the strength of the keys used with those algorithms. The security also depends on the engineering of the protocol used by the system to ensure that there are no non-cryptographic ways to bypass the security of the overall system.
The Diffie-Hellman Groups parameter is the most important one to choose conservatively. Any party capturing all traffic that can break the selected DH group can retroactively gain access to the symmetric keys used to encrypt all the IPsec data. However, specifying extremely large DH group also puts a considerable load on the device, especially when this is a large VPN gateway or an IoT constrained device.
This document concerns itself with the selection of cryptographic algorithms for the use of IKEv2, specifically with the selection of "mandatory-to-implement" algorithms. The algorithms identified in this document as "MUST implement" or "SHOULD implement" are not known to be broken at the current time, and cryptographic research so far leads us to believe that they will likely remain secure into the foreseeable future. However, this isn't necessarily forever and it is expected that new revisions of this document will be issued from time to time to reflect the current best practice in this area.
IANA Considerations
This document makes no requests of IANA.
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